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STATE REORGANIZATION MOVEMENT

THE STATE REORGANIZATION- MOVEMENT*
WILLIAM H. EDWARDS**

Jacksonian Democracy, the popular revolt against the "boss and
the machine," the settlement of the west, the development of a
complex urban and industrial society, and the mounting cost of, gov-

ernment were underlying forces which led to the movement for the
reconstruction of state governments. These factors weakened the
governor's administrative position, and the reorganization movement,
distinctly crystallized by 1915 proposed to return the governor to his
original status-'"about the same relative position as the President."'
Two distinct constitutional tendencies arose from these social forces.
One was the popular election of state officials. The other was the
enormous increase of independent administrative agencies. The two
trends cannot be strictly confined to distinct periods, nor are they
mutually exclusive. But the former was dominant during the first
half of the Nineteenth Century and reached its peak by I85o. The
latter became manifest especially in the second half of the century and
continued approximately to 1915. The causes of the first tendency
were the democratizing and equalizing influence of the Jacksonian
Era, on one hand, and the rising tide of opposition to invisible government on the other. At present the futility of popular election of
state executives (except the governor) as a means of eliminating the
boss is generally recognized. But in the last century most people
believed that such an electoral process would accomplish that end.
That this misconception continued in the popular mind, even into
the latter part of the past century, is evident from the direct election
of such officials as Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners. In
time, however, it was realized that such a practice merely played into
the hands of the professional politician and entrenched the machine
more firmly than ever.
It will be concluded in the next
*This aritcle continued from 1 DAK. L. REV. 12.
issue of the REVIEW.
.. nstructor in American History, University of North Dakota.
Elihu Root in his speech before the New York Constitutional Convention August 30,
1915 explained the implications of the terms "boss and machine" and "invisible government"
in an inimitable fashion: "The government of the state has presented two different lines
of activity; one of the constitutional and statutory officers of the state, and the other of
They call the systiem-I don't coin the
the party leaders; they call them party bosses.
phrase, I adopt it because it carries its own meaning-tbe system they call "invisible gov.
ernment."
For 1 don't know how many years Mr. Conklirg was the supreme ruler in this
state. The governor did not count, the legislatures did not count, comptrollers and secretaries of state and what not did not count. It was what Mr. Conkling said . . . Then Mr.
Platt ruled the state . . . The capitol was not here; it was at 49 Broadway; Mr. Platt and his
It makes no difference what name you give . . . Fenton or Conkling or
lieutenants.
Cornell or Arthur or Platt or by the names of men now living. The ruler of the state
during the forty years of my acquaintance . . . has not been any man authorized by the
constitution or by law; and, sir, there is a deep and sullen and long-continued resentment
at being governed by men not of the people's choosing. The party leader is elected by no one,
accountable to no one, bound by no oath of office, removable by no one . .. What does
the boss have to do? He has to urge the appointment of a man whose appointment will
The invisible government proceeds to maintain its power
. preserve the organization.
by a reversal of the fundamental principle of good government. . . . Everyone of you knows
what I say about the use of patronage under the system of invisible government is true ....
A' great number,
They were appointed, to promote the power of political organization.
seldom here, rendering no service are put on the payrolls as a matter of party patronage.
See int'ra
Both parties are alike'. MUNICIPAL RESEARCH, No. 63, 627-9, July 1915.
Charles Evans Hughes statement on patronage, and Orth, S. P. The Boss cod the Machine,
C'HRON. OF AM., Series XLIII.
2 GOODNOW, F. J., COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 81.
See Field v.
People, 3 Illinois 79, and Exparte Holmes, 12 Vermont 643, for difference between the
legal status of the governor and the President; JOHNSON, A. AND ROBINSON, W. A.:
READINGS IN RECENT AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 1876-1926, chs.
35 and 36; HOLCOMBE, STATE GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED 9TATES, revised
ed 289 CLEVELAND AND BUCK, THE BUDGET AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERN.
MkNT,' 62 for political, social and economic favors weakening the governor's powers.
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The causes of the second tendency were the speedy building up
of the west, the disappearance of the frontier, the astounding growth
of cities and rise of manufactures and commerce. Colossal undertakings were made in the field of public works and state enterprises.
The Erie Canal was one of the initial undertakings in an era of
internal improvements. The new democracy demanded equality in
education, and the consequence was the state board of education and
the state university. Concentrated populations brought a cry for
protection against the ravages of disease, the provision for good water
supply, pure milk and food. Aided by recent advances in science,
the states have undertaken to care for the mentally and physically
disabled, the criminals, the poor, and the other unfortunate wards
of the state. The rapid exploitation of the natural resources led to
the creation of agencies to prevent their destruction. In an effort
to aid in the solution of the problems of modern industry, services
were established to deal with the relations of employer and employee,
to control or supervise in a general way the wages, hours, and conditions of labor, and to protect the consumer against monopoly and
fraud. Massachusetts was one of the first states to create new
administrative services. In 1837 the state board of education was
established.; in 1838, the bank commissioner; in 1853, the board of
agriculture; in I855, the insurance commissioner; in 1863, the state
board of charity; in 1865, the tax commissioner; in 1866, the commission on fish and game; in 1869, the state board of health, the
railroad commission, and the bureau of labor statistics, and in 1870,
the office of corporation commissioner. By the second decade of this
century Massachusetts had over IOO different administrative services.
Her experience was typical of all states.For our purposes, the most significant aspect of this trend is
not the number of new administrative agencies. Rather it is the
independence of these agencies from the governor's control. Through
such independence, the specialized humanitarian, social, and public
welfare groups favoring the establishment of these new services
hoped such agencies would not be embroiled in partisan politics. Experience with practical politics had taught them that control of the
governor and the executive branch by political parties meant the
appointment of faithful partisans regardless of competence. Political
machines, they found, were potent forces and unless they faced the
problem squarely and set up every possible barrier against the encroachment of the spoilsman, their new agency would be inefficiently
and incompletely managed, if, indeed, the whole object of creating
the service was not nullified. In brief, their desire with regard to
their particular agency was to replace partisan administration with
competent administration, to replace professional politician with professional technician. Their task was not any easy one. They had
little reason for optimism. All the other government services were
controlled by the machine. How could their newly proposed agency
be made an exception? In the attempt to solve this problem a "new
species of political propaganda" arose.- Unable to compete with the
invisible government at the polls, they could through their human
appeal secure the legislation they desired.
What was to be their technique of keeping their agency "out
3Illinois

had 100, New York 187 and Michigan 116.
4 Cleveland and Buck, Op. Cit., 65.
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of politics ?" One scheme had already been tried and had failed utterly
-popular election of the head of the service. Their approach to the
problem was sufficiently realistic to avoid placing their faith in the
alleged "responsibility" of any popularly elected executive, not excluding the governor. They sought a system of appointment which
Several varieties of boards
would give the agency independence.
and commissions were tried. After many disheartening experiences,
these humanitarian groups found that the most fool proof method
was to head the service with a board of seven or more members
appointed by the governor for seven or more years with terms overlapping in order that a governor with a two year term might not be
able to dominate the board. The board in turn was to appoint the
executive head of the service. The governor realizing his inability
to dominate the board usually made those appointments on the basis
of merit alone. The fact that the board members were unpaid further
eliminated the spoilsman's influence. As an additional precaution, the
governor was frequently required to make his appointments upon
the recommendation of interested social groups. Authorities are agreed
that this process of appointment removed administration from politics
as completely as possible.5 Not only did this type reduce political influence to a minimum but continuity was secured and experts were
appointed for the highest offices as well as for the routine positions.
Thus, these two decentralizing tendencies, the popular election
of executives and the establishment of independent administrative
agencies, weakened the governor's administrative powers. Consequently, the proponents.of the federal plan of reorganization opposed
them. The advocates of this plan attacked the preceding movement
to take certain services out of "politics" not only because the executive branch had become disorganized and lacked correlation but because it did not provide for responsible leadership. Instead of disposing of the irresponsible boss, they contended that the irresponsible humanitarian leader took his place along side the boss. They
conceded, however, that, under the preceding movement, administrative agencies were for the first time manned by skilled technologists who held office on the basis of ability alone. But this apparently was not enough. The advocates of reorganization worked
upon the assumption that if the governor was placed in control of the
entire state administration and if the people in turn held him strictly
accountable, then he would make the government as a whole efficient
where before only certain segregated branches were efficient. This
was the theory on which they justified the destruction or reconstruction of those agencies which had succeeded in installing a personnel
of technologists instead of spoilsmen. Did their theory work? Was
the reconstruction of those services justified?
All criticism of inefficient, and irresponsible, government remained academic until the public began to wince under the burden of
taxes. Then practical politicians took up the cry and seized upon the
scheme of the political scientists and research organizations as a practical remedy for the high cost of government. The opportunistic politician and the idealistic student united in their efforts to establish
state reorganization and efficiency and economy commissions. The
politician playing the role of the economist was not unique. Indeed,
the originators of the "spoils system" in the United States preached
5 Ibid.,

65, 66.

Holcombe, Op. Cit., 395.
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"efficiency and economy" in their campaigns.- From that day to this
politicians have promised economy. During this "era of efficiency
and economy commissions",7 or since i9io, economy was masked in
a new garb. Taxes were to be cut down not by "turning the rascals
out" as before, but by a pseudo-scientific reorganization of the executive branch of the government. Since I9io politician and student
have agreed that "the chief cause of the high cost of government
was waste and inefficiency"s inherent in existing methods. This
emphasis upon finances effected a movement for fiscal retrenchment.
Consequently, this era of efficiency and economy commissions saw
the inauguration of a movement for budget'reform, a companion movement to that for administrative reconstruction.
The greatest impetus to the reorganization movement was given
by President Taft when he appointed his Efficiency and Economy
Commission of I9io headed by Dr. F. A. Cleveland. True, prior to
this time states had considered administrative consolidation, but the
reforms had been only "piecemeal", that is, the unifying of agencies
within a certain field such as labor, education, commerce, health. But,
after the creation of Taft's Commission, plans were forwarded for
comprehensive reconstruction of the entire state administration. The
following year, 1911, Oregon and Wisconsin considered schemes for
reorganization. In 1912, commissions were appointed in New Jersey
and Massachusetts; in 1913, in New York, Iowa, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota. Thus the movement continued apace, until
now thirteen states have been completely reorganized along the most
approved lines and a score of others have considered such projects.
The general demand on the part of all of the efficiency and
economy commissions was that there should be a more scientific functional consolidation of agencies in related fields. All were agreed
upon the necessity of eliminating overlapping jurisdiction, duplication
of effort, inefficient budget and accounting methods, and the lessening of overhead. But the commissions were not agreed regarding
the proper status of the governor. Some proposed that the governor
should be in the main a 'political and titular officer, others that he
should be the real administrative chief in addition to his political and
formal duties. Thus two types of reorganization were advanced. The
first carried the movement to take particular services "out of politics"
to its logical conclusion. Sometimes it has been called "government
by commission", and at other times it has been called the board of
directors plan because the constitutional structure of the business corporation with a board of directors and a general manager was proposed for each major department. The second type has been called
the federal plan and its idea of placing all administrative power in
the governor who is directly responsible to the people has already
been noted. The advocates of each of the two types said that it was
the manifest destiny of American government that their particular
type should be accepted; that to accept the other alternative would
be to go contrary to the inevitable trend of our political institutions.
"Efficiency and Economy", was a phrase used by Thomas Benton in praise of Jackson "who had made a clean sweep of the office-holders, and filled their places with
'true Republicans.' " It is interesting to observe the originators of.the first great national
party machine using the term "efficiency and economy" in the same breath with "rotation"
and "to the victor belongs the spoils of the enemy." STANWOOD, A HISTORY OF THE
PRESIDENCY,
I, 153. See also WRIGHT, BOSSISM IN CINCINNATI.
T
Holcombe, Op. Cit. 805.
OCleveland and Buci, Op. Cit., 70.
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For instance an advocate of the second type said: "The constitutional
history of the states is a history of the growth of limitations upon the
authority of the legislature and of the expansion of that of the executive."- But the proponents of the first type might reply that history
also is one of the growth of the boss and invisible government a trend
deplored by both, and that the governor's supremacy depends upon invisible government. If such is the case then the hue and cry about the
governor's direct responsibility to the people is futile. Indeed, some
leaders of the federal plan type of reorganization concede its failure
because the governor in reality, has not been responsible in spite of
the fact that this plan has centered all power in his hands.o
The first type was proposed for Wisconsin in 1911, for New
Jersey in 1912, for Michigan in I919, and for Maryland in 1921. The
New Jersey plan is the most clear cut case of the board of directors
idea. It proposed the establishment of eight major departments each
headed by a board and a commissioner appointed by and responsible
to the board. To quote:
"All modern enterprises are conducted by corporations
guided by a board of directors; in fact, the law in this state-as in
others-provides that the business of any corporation shall be managed
by its directors, and that each shall have a chief executive called its
president. .

.

. It has, therefore, been our aim to group together com-

missions and officials engaged in the same kind of work, and to consolidate such work in one department, with a board of directors, and
a chief corresponding to the president of the corporation. The powers
of consolidated departments we believe should be conferred upon the
board of directors, so that it may define the policy to be pursued by the
department, and to enact rules and regulations to be observed by the
chief and all employees."

Their primary object in creating the boards was to eliminate.
political partisanship and to insure the appointment of technologists
to all offices and positions. The chief precautions against parisanship were to appoint members to the boards with long overlapping
terms in order that one governor might not dominate the boards, to
prohibit the appointment of a majority of members from any one
party, to make positions on the board non-salaried, and to prevent
removal of the commissioner of the department by the governor
except upon the demand of the majority of the board and after a cautious process of public hearings. In opposing the payment of salaries
to board members the reorganization commission declared:
"We have seriously considered the advisability of paying some
small salary, but experience has shown that for every salary offered
there are numerous office seekers, the majority of whom scarcely
measure up to the salaries to be paid. We believe that there are
many public-spirited men in the state who cannot be induced to enter
the employ of the state on a salary basis, but who would cheerfully
give their services if they are afforded fair opportunity to have a
voice in shaping the policies of the state and improving general
conditions."-

Advocates of the second type of reorganization, based upon the
Op. Cit., 403.
I20Holcombe,
Ibid., 305; Cleveland and

Buck, Of. Cit., 111.
12Ibid., 96. Report of the Commission upon the Reorganization and Consolidation of
the different Departments of the State government of New Jersey.
Ibid., 96-7. NEW JERSEY SESSION LAWS, 1915, ch. 241.
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federal plan, denounced the New Jersey plan as an "aristocracy of
intelligence," not under popular control.a Their further complaint,
that the first type of reorganization does not provide co-ordination
and unity, is not entirely valid in the case of the New Jersey reorganization. The alternative to securing unity by centering all power
in the governor was to provide monthly meetings of the heads of the
major departments for the purpose of promoting efficiency and preventing duplication, to permit the temporary transfer of personnel
and equipment from one department to another, and to allow departments to combine their efforts to prosecute similar undertakings. The
highly desirable privilege given the New Jersey administrative departments of determining their own internal administration and of
creating and abolishing offices within their department facilitated such
interdepartmental co-operation.I,
New Jersey and Wisconsin were the first states to propose and
adopt comprehensive plans of state reorganization, and these states
followed the first type. In later years, the federal plan became the
prevalent type with one outstanding exception, the Maryland reconstruction of 1923. The reorganization commission of that state condemned the federal plan as installed in Illinois and followed in other
states, opposed the movement "to centralize power in the hands of the
governor," and advocated the board of directors plan in order to
eradicate partisan politics. It said in part:
"The Governor has no need for further power. Indeed, the expression,-so frequently used as one of the strong features of the
cut and dried reorganization plan which has started the round of the
states,-'centralized power in the hands of the Governor,' really involves the use of loose language; for

. . . the things done in other

states thus to centralize power in the Governor, do not centralize any
new power in him at all, but remove the checks . . . which certainly
ought to be retained. . . . (The need) is facilities for keeping in-

formed and advised as to exactly how departments
ing....
"Policy making boards

....

are function-

will not only assure the benefits of

combined judgment on the important questions of policy which these
boards must constantly decide but it should remove such questions
from political considerations and influences. Moreover. in the case
of these boards, we believe that stronger members can be secured if
they are not salaried, but as at present give their services as a duty
and an honor."5
The Maryland commission defended the idea of overlapping terms
and minority representation against the "loose language" used by the
advocates of governor's responsibility.
Five ends were achieved in the movement to reorganize the states
The consolidation
i.
on the basis of the board of directors:
of services along functional lines eliminated inefficiency. 2. The removal of administration from political influence led to the appointment
of experts instead of spoilsmen. 3. Boards composed of many membe'rs with long overlapping tenures insured continuity of service in
spite of the ins and outs of politics. 4. Boards of investigation,
"The

justice of this criticism will be considered fully in the next article.
Contrast this departmental freedom to the subjection of departments under the federal
plan. Infra, 19.
-1Plan for the Reorganization of the Administrative Departments of the State Government of Maryland and for the Reduction of the Number of Elections in Maryland, by the
Reorganization Commission of Maryland, adopted September 14, 1921, p. 20.
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advice and publicity tended to make "responsibility" of the executive
branch a reality. 5. Under the board of directors plan the idea of
centralization and unity was not carried to such an extreme that the
chief executive officers were given more power than they were able
to administer capably. The complaint which the proponents of the
federal plan make against the first type of reconstruction is that the
administration is not sufficiently susceptible to popular will. But
responsibility is a relative matter; and since there is some question as
to whether the federal plan itself has secured the desired degree
of responsibility, this matter will be handled at a later stage.
The second type of reorganization was first proposed on a comprehensive basis in 1913 for the states of Minnesota and Iowa. Prior
to this time there had been some agitation in behalf of this plan by
the Peoples' Power League of Oregon, in 19o9 and 1911, and as far
back as 1892 Governor Russell of Massachusetts spoke of the need
of such a reorganization.o But beginning in 1913, the federal plan
of reorganization has spread rapidly from state to state. In view of
the many admirable historical studies of the "state reorganization
movement", it seems hardly necessary for the ends of this study to
trace the details of how state efficiency and economy commissions were
appointed after much agitation throughout the states, how these commissions spent months conducting investigations, holding hearings,
drawing up their findings, presenting their recommendations, how
the legislature was influenced by government research, and civic
groups, and how the legislature following long continued debate finally
decided to accept the plan usually with numerous amendments, or to
reject it entirely.A critical analysis of the movement to reorganize the states on the
basis of the federal plan necessitates an observation of its economic as
well as its political and administrative features. Its promise of checking the mounting cost of government. gave the movement its driving
force. But the contention of proponents of the federal plan that "the
chief cause of the high cost of government was waste and inefficiency"
is not accurately true. If the total annual expenditure really varies in
direct proportion to the amount of waste and inefficiency, then it
might be contended that the unfortunate administrations of President
Grant were many times more efficient than the economical and common
sensical administrations of President Coolidge, because the expenditures of the former President were infinitely less than those under
the latter. In other words, the constant and increasing demand for
more and better government services, has been a more decisive factor
in the growing cost of government than "waste and inefficiency." The
introduction of more efficient methods results in more service for the
same cost. The total expenditure, however, is seldom lowered thereby
because of the increase of government services. Past efforts at
governmental economy too often bear evidences of straining at gnats
and swallowing camels. As long as unscrupulous politicians are allowed to feed at the public trough, little is to be accomplished by creating
budget bureaus or bureaus of efficiency.
6 Message of Governor William E. Russell to the Legislature of Massachusetts, January
7, 1892. Johnson and Robison, Op. Cit., 409.
1WEBER,
G.
A.
ORGANIZED
EFFORTS
FOR THE
IMPROVEMENT OF
METHODS OF ADMINISTRATION IN THE U. S.; MOLEY, R., THE STATE MOVECON.
E
ADMINISTRATIVE
BUCK
A
AND
ECONOMY;
MENT FOR EFFICIENCY
SOLIDATION IN STATE GOVERNMENTS; CRENNAN, i.d H., SURVEY OF STATE
of
(University
OF
REORGANIZATION,
PLAN
AND
ORGANIZATION
EXECUTIVE
Pennsylvania Thesis, 1916).
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If we find students of government promising the impossible, what
may we expect from the politicians who have adopted their program?
Is it surpirising to find the latter assuring the voter that by accepting
the efficiency and economy methods patented by their party, it will
be possible to reduce the voters' taxes by many millions? The predominance of the economy issue in all political campaigns has been
stressed. Indeed, one of the most important reasons that the members of legislatures and politicians in general support the reorganization and budget movements is because it is a basis for their promise
of economy. In some instances it appears that there was no other
motive for supporting the movement than to be able to tell the voter
their taxes would be reduced. However, with the adoption of the
Ohio Code, the high cost of government evil was not only not eradicated but expenditures increased and the administration was a most
inauspicious one. It would seem therefore that those who press this
claim of economy are either deceiving themselves or wilfully deceiving the people. For instance, one often hears the "spellbinder" pleading for "lower taxes and better roads", or lower taxes, the direct primary, and prohibition enforcement, or lower taxes and some other new
governmental activity which would involve the expenditure of hundreds of thousands of dollars. If the propagandist really wanted the
people's taxes reduced, he should have urged the abolition of certain
services Such as education or health.
Indeed, reorganization advocates have on occasion connected their
movement with one to lessen government services. They contended
that the movement for the federal plan was opposed to the preceding
movement to take services "out of politics" because one group wanted
more and better services while the other wanted fewer services and
lower taxes. If such is their program, then the movement deserves no
longer to be called a movement for efficiency and economy, for it
might as well be called a movement for inefficiency and waste. It
apparently is not realized that an increase of expenditures may aid in
bringing about an increase of efficiency, the elimination of spoils,
the lessening of the possibilities of corruption, the securing of experts, the realization of more service for the taxpayer's dollar, and the
development of better government generally. The following condition
in California indicates the consequences of false economy:
"California is tasting the bitter fruits of false economy in government. In 1922 the voters defeated Gov. William D. Stephensons
of the old Hiram Johnson dynasty, and elected Friend W. Richardson
on the single platform of "economy". To make good his election
promise Richardson slashed ruthlessly into the vitals of every governing function.
"Richardson cut the forestry department budget in half. Today
forest fires are raging unchecked, eating into some of California's most
valuable pine and redwood forests and menacing the Tahoe and Sequoia national forest reserves. To date 84,ooo acres have been destroyed and $9o0,ooo damages incurred, although the dry season is
not half over.
"Richardson cut $85,5oo a year from the Bureau of Animal Industry. Early this spring the foot and mouth disease broke out among
California cattle, spreading to 20 counties and causing inestimable
damage to the cattle industry. While saving $85,ooo a year in taxes,
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thepeople have subscribed out of their pockets $2,ooo,ooo which must
be repaid at the next legislature, but the damage will be io times that
in the state at large.
"Richardson cut $300,000 from the industrial accident commission

budget. The first year following there occured 716 industrial deaths,
more than ever in the state's history. One commissioner, resigning,
stated that thousands of uninspected boilers and elevators are a constant menace to life in California, that there is no mine inspection at
all and that there are flagrant violations of safety rules in buildings
all over the state.
"All the state's institutions, from the two big penitentiaries to the
homes for blind and feebleminded children, from the two big penitentiaries to the homes for blind and feebleminded children, are badly
overcrowded. The schools are suffering and feebleminded children,
are badly overcrowded. The schools are suffering from lack of
teaching force and facilities in the seven state normals. No attempt
is being made to enforce the women's minimum wage law. Americanization of immigrants has stopped. The work of stamping out tuberculosis and "red plague" has about ceased. And, having made no
provision for new revenue, Richardson will present the next legislature with a $5,000,000 shortage below the present meagre budget.

"Too much economy is expensive."Although the economy features of the reorganization movement
have been exaggerated, there is no question but what great savings
can be made through the introduction of more efficient budget and
accounting systems, through the functional grouping of organization
units, through the elimination of duplication and overlapping jurisdiction, and through the standardization of administrative technique.
In evaluating the various aspects of the federal plan for states,
the first query to be raised is the validity of the federal analogy. The
influence of the adoption of the federal Constitution upon the structure of the local governmental units has been observed. Now the
reorganization movement aims to make the state governments more
like the federal structure than ever before. In supporting the applicability of the federal plan to the state and municipal units the protagonist reasons as follows: "Now in the federal government, we
have the case of that unit undertaking the construction of the Panama
Canal. In the state of Illinois, we observe that unit building a great
drainage canal. While in the city of Chicago we find that unit digging a small passage to drain one of the lagoons in Lincoln Park.
Thus, the various units perform functions of a similar nature differing only in size and jurisdiction. These facts combined with others
show that a constitutional structure that is good for one is good for
them all." Perhaps, but does the conclusion necessarily follow that
the federal plan should be adopted in the states? Was not the federal
plan for municipalities discarded by municipal reformers as futile, and
was not the city manager plan accepted as the fundamental solution?
However, there seems to be considerable disagreement among the
municipal reform and government research groups, as to just what
stand they should take. Some take the consistent stand of advocating
the extension of the city manager idea to the states on the basis of true
representative government through legislative supremacy and non-poli"ST. PAUL DAILY NEWS, July 19, 1924.
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tical administration. Others take the consistent stand of advocating the
federal plan for both state and municipality on the basis of direct democracy through executive supremacy and political administration. Still
others take the apparently inconsistent stand of favoring the city manager plan for municipalities and the federal plan for states justifying
their position on the basis of expediency. They explain their alleged inconsistency by saying that "while there may be much to be said in favor
of such a plan (of responsibility of the governor and the administration
to the legislature), it has seemed to the committee of the National Municipal League that for some time to come such a reversal of established
American methods will not be approved."9 Notwithstanding these explanations, associations assuming such an inconsistent position lay
themselves open to criticism. For instance, the following observation
was made of the stand of the Short Ballot Association: "Although
it supported the commission manager plan this was inconsistent with
the short ballot propaganda in that the manager was not to be elected.
The commission manager idea was in fact another device to keep
the leadership of the public service out of politics and free from
electoral control ....
In fact, one of its claims to popular support was
that the manager as chief executive would not be in politics."- But
even those who consistently advocate the federal plan for all spheres
of government recognize defects in the federal structure. For instance,
F. A. Cleveland and A. E. Buck, leaders in the state reorganization
and budget movements, contended that "the reason we have invisible
and irresponsible government" is owing to the improper status of the
offices of "President and governors." In spite of these compromising
factors the federal plan has been accepted as model for state reorganization.
There are three fundamental principles which underlie this plan of
reconstruction: unity, leadership, and responsibility. It advocates aim
to establish "responsible leadership through the visible elected official
in place of the irresponsible leadership by the boss of the invisible
machine." They contend that all power must be centralized in the
governor because the state services should be considered as a unit.
With such power centralized in the hands of the governor, it is assumed that he would take over the leadership of all governmenal operations, political and administrative, and would be accountable directly
to the people for all activities of the state government. This system
is often termed "one man control". It is defined as a plan "to institutionalize leadership by reorganizing the public service in a manner
to make the chief executive the outstanding person in politics." Its
proponents declare that the movement was designed to locate responsibility through providing a strong, sole executive leadership-a leadership within the government which could be effected for directing and
improving the public service and at the same time could be reached
and controlled by the electorate and their representatives. In contemplating the attainment of responsible leadership and the elimination of invisible government, Cleveland and Buck set forth two
possible courses (I) centralizing all power in the governor, or (2)
leaving him a titular head. Their statement reads:
"Failure to recognize the President and the governors as leaders
might have been made consistent with principles of responsible gov-

"

NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, A MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION.
"Cleveland and Buck, op. cit.. 107.
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ernment if they had placed on the chairman of their committees executive responsibility. But they did not. Instead of linking up executive
responsibility with their committee leadership as in a parliamentary
cabinet system, or of accepting the alternative of bringing the elected
executive before the representative body to give an account of past
acts and to explain future proposals before supplies were granted, the
Congress and the assemblies turned over their powers of inquest and
discussion, their function as one of the two essential organs of popular
control, to the standing committees which had been organized by them
to be exercised in a secret irresponsible manner. And this is the
reason that we have 'invisible' and irresponsible government."Instead of allowing the governor to become the figure head of the
executive department and vesting all power in the representative body,
the advocates of reconstruction chose the other alternative. This they
did in spite of the political teachings of the ages which show that the
elected executive becomes responsible not to the legislature but to
"the boss and the machine."
With regard to the principle of unity as applied to the federal
plan, one proponent concluded: "State administration is a single task
.. . (and) The Governor must have an organization that will treat
(it) as a single task."- But only in a limited and somewhat superfical sense is this true. It can hardly be said to be much more of a
unit than human society itself. One of the greatest dificulties that the
political reformers and the state reorganization protagonists have to
face is that all but irresistible desire to oversimplify. In the words of
Walter Lippman, "Nothing is easier than to simplify life and make
a philosophy about it. The trouble is that the resulting. philosophy is
true only of that simplified life." If society is complex, our social
organization must be moulded and manipulated accordingly. If governments have many intricate and diversified functions, a complex
superstructure must be established to conform to it. There is little
justification in the unification of such unrelated activities as building
roads, inspection of insurance companies, propagation of fish, and
mental hygiene.
The only conceivable basis for administrative unity is the fact that
certain processes and things are,necessary to all human activities governmental and otherwise. Human beings are necessary to operate
the services. Money is necessary to finance them. Offices are necessary to work in. Tools are necessary to work with. Does the fact
that all services have these characteristics in common justify considering state administration as a "single task" and centralizing all power
in the hands of one man? Federal plan advocates answer in the
affirmative. But this is hardly sufficient grounds for such an extreme
concentration of power.
This conception of unity is expressed by the subjection of the
services as far as possible to the arbitrary whims of the governor,
and by the creation of a central department wbich possesses very substantial powers of control over the other departments. As far as the
governor's personal control is concerned, it is all but impossible for
him to express this unity in any real fashion. Critics say that the
state reorganization protagonists have made "too much of a fetish of
the principle of one-man control." Students of comparative govern392.
Dbid.,
STATE GOVERNMENT, 275-6.
DODD,
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ment hold that the idea of one man conducting the government of a
great state in the present complex social system is untenable. in
Europe as in America, the shortcomings of concentrating all power
and authority in one man are recognized. For instance, Prince Max
of Baden when he became Chancellor of Germany after the Kaiser's
abdication observed "how difficult it was for one man to bear the tremendous responsibility of government in modern societies. The chance
of error is too great. Bismarck himself constantly broke down in
health."- European students commenting upon the situation in the
United States suggest that "the one-man executive should give way to
a responsible cabinet." Inthe United States, the early martyrdoms of
Harrison and Taylor as well as the recent deaths of Wilson and Harding were the direct result of the physical strain upon the incumbent
of the presidency. It may be recalled how newspapers at the time of
Harding's death bemoaned the sacrifice of the lives of our presidents
upon the altar of overwork. The plea was made that the extensive
duties vested in that office be lessened. In addition to the enormous
political and administrative duties, the president's strength is further
sapped by his participation in many varieties of public demonstrations
and formalities accompanied by the usual amount of handshaking.
Even an easy going executive like Harding was unable to throw off
the burden of office. Yet this is the condition in which the federal
plan advocates wish to place our state governors. For the good of
the nation as well as the incumbent in office, the duties of the chief
executives in both the state and federal spheres should be diminished
instead of extended.
In addition to the personification of unity in the governor, the
new reorganization codes institutionalize unity by creating a central
department of control endowed with formidable authority over all
other departments in such matters as finance, audit, personnel, and
purchasing. This central agency is supposed to act in the name of the
governor and to be the hands of the governor in executing his policy.
To the extent that efficient budget and accounting methods are promoted, this agency has been of real value. But many of these new
agencies of control through other practices inhibit efficiency as much
as they promote it because of its unlimited power to arbitrarily intervene
in the internal affairs of other departments, and because of the undesirable character of its personnel.
The domineering authority of this agency over the various departments tends at times to become capricious and arbitrary. Its
staff does not know and should not be expected to know all the detailed needs of the various services. And when it steps in, supposedly
in the interests of efficiency and economy, to prevent the performance
of certain specialized functions which constitute a portion of a well
thought out departmental policy, the agency acts in an arbitrary manner
in the worst sense of the term. The extent to which a central control
agency should have charge of general fiscal and personnel activities
of the state will be considered elsewhere. It is sufficient to say at this
point that the most recent tendency seems to be toward greater departmental independence rather than a straight-jacket control by a
political dictator.The incompetence of the agency's personnel may be traced to the
- FINER, H., FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AT WORK, 46.
DAWSON, R. M., PRINCIPLE OF OFFICIAL INDEPENDENCE.
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operation of the principle of governor's responsibility. When such a
powerful department is composed of intimate friends and political
supporters of the governor in order that the latter may have absolute
control over it, there is a possibility of the agency functioning with
purely partisan ends in view. That is, instead of controlling funds
in order that the state services may be increased and utilized to the
benefit of the people of the state, the agency tends to exercise its control as a means of perpetuating the party in power. In Ohio, where an
administration was swept into power on a program of economy and reorganization, the central agency was manned by deserving party supporters who used the methods of the spoilsman. Consequently, owing
to this bad start, the administrative reorganization in that state has been
discredited.-s Thus a central control agency proves to be a liability when
an administration is characterized by spoils and political partisanship.
Without this agency, unfortunate political manipulation might be
localized to certain services; but with it, the whole state administration
may suffer.
This sort of manifestation of "state administrative unity" constitutes a challenge to the fundamental concepts of representative government. It means the usurpation of vital legislative functions by the
administration in the form of a central controlling agency independent
of the legislative branch. The executive branch is that which performs
the services while the legislative is that which watches and controls
the executive. Woodrow Wilson deplored the fact that in the United
States the legislative branch did not fully possess its most important
function which he termed the "informing function".-, Should not state
unity be an attribute of the representative branch rather than the
executive? Again to quote the words of Bluntschli: "All the other
functions of the government belong to the particular organs but legislation to the whole body politic. As the whole is more than any
of its parts . . . so legislative power is superior to all the other particular powers."- To the extent that a central control agency exists,
it should be directly responsible to the legislative, not to the executive
branch. Indeed, many of the reorganization advocates concede that
such a central fiscal agency as the State Auditor should be directly
responsible to the legislature and not the governor.
Although the central agencies of control established under the new
reorganization codes improve budgeting and general administrative
methods to a degree, the principle of unity as expressed in the federal
plan may be challenged because the state government is not sufficiently
a unit to justify the extent to which "one man control" is carried,
because it is all but impossible for the executive in the modern state
to fulfill all the extensive powers bestowed upon him, because the central agency's powers may be administered capriciously and dogmatically, because that agency is apt to be manipulated by political partisans,
and because, according to the basic principles of representative government, unity resides in the legislative branch. In criticising the idea
of unity in the reorganization movement, one authority concluded
Dogmas of Administrative Reform, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE
-Coker,
REVIEW, XVI 399. Pollock, Four Years Under the Ohio Reorganization Code, NATIONAL
Miles, R. E., Fiscal Control in Ohio, ANNALS OF
MUNICIPAL kEVIEW, XIV, 561.
THE AMERICAL ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, CXIII, 105.
CRYING SHAME OF OHIO a biased Democratic pamphlet gives a scathing criticism of the
administration of 1921-23.
Republican
5
' WILSON, W., CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT. 303.
'
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"both reason and experience show that for the administration of many
functions diffusion rather than concentration of authority secures not
only more efficient but also more democratic administration."-s In view
of these facts would it not be well to heed Lippman's warning and
avoid unfortunate consequences?
Leadership as applied to the governor's office under the federal
plan of reorganization is titular, administrative, and political in character. His ceremonial leadership is analagous to that exercised by
the British king or the nominal head of any great state. His executive leadership is analagous to that of the general manager of a supercorporation. His political leadership, since he is independent of the
legislature, is somewhat analagous to that of the British parliament.
Being endowed with all three of these distinct types of leadership
he finds the burden too great to exercise any one of them satisfactorily.
In the first place he fills an exalted position as head of a state.
Much time must be devoted to the formal ceremonies inseparably connected with that office. He is expected to attend all sorts of functions
not only relating to many official ceremonies but to a multitude of
events both within and outside the limits of the state-including attendance at livestock expositions, baseball and football games and other
sports, innumerable conventions of a commercial, social or patriotic
character, and he is usually expected to make an address at such
functions. The fact that he stands out as the leader of a great political
party makes the skillful execution of such perfunctory acts as kissing
babies and laying cornerstones all the part of a day's work and by
no means an insignificant part. These ceremonial duties occupy such a
large portion of his time that it is difficult for him to assume the
administrative leadership centered in his office by the reorganization
codes.
In the second place, his leadership is considered that of an administrative chief or general manager. But is such a position consistent
with his selection by popular vote? To support the argument for administrative leadership, its advocates contend that the federal plan is
analogous to the constitution of a business corporation. The legislature is compared to the board of directors, the governor to the general manager, the people to the stockholders. The analogy is erroneous
because the executive is selected not by a representative body as is
the case in a business corporation, but by the electors who are in a
position analogous to the stockholders of a corporation. In setting
forth "The fundamental issue" in the campaign of 1912, the Outlook
supported the federal plan of direct democracy, opposed the idea of
representative government, and suggested the analogy of the structure
of government to that of the business corporation.
"The fundamental issue is between the government by the people
and government by representatives of the people. Do the ninety
millions of people govern themselves? Or do they elect wise men
to govern them? Do they decide what shall be done and elect representatives to do it? Or do they elect representatives to decide what is
to be done and then do it?
"The stockholders of a great corporation elect directors and leave
them to manage its affairs, while they go about their individual busi'Coker,
Op. cit., XVI, 411. -He also spoke of the "uselessness of extending the scope
of power or any officer beyond the limits of what that officer can actually devote his
attention to."
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ness. One conception of government regards the ninety million
Americans as stockholders who elect directors to carry on the business
of the Republic in their interest . . . The other conception of government regards the ninety million Americans as their own directors.
"The Outlook believes in the second conception."-s
The writer accepts the first conception. How much confidence
could one place in a business corporation whose managers, engineers,
mechanics and other technologists were selected by vote of the stockholders? Yet the electors are no more capable of selecting competent
administrators and experts than are the stockholders. If we accept
Chief Justice Ryan's dictum: "Where you want skill you appoint.
Where you want representation you elect,"- then the governor to possess
the qualifications of a skilled administrative leader should be appointed.
Upon a second thought, no one would contend that the voters are able
to select technologists. A person going to the polls when he thinks
at all seldom thinks of voting for a governor because of his competence
as an administrator, but rather because he advocates certain policies,
administrative or otherwise. It is as logical to select one who admires
beautiful pictures as being a good artist or one who admires a magnificant cathedral as capable of building one like it. To the extent the
proponents of reorganization expect the governor to exercise leadership from its administrative side they are doomed to disappointment.
The elective process procures lay representation not skilled administration.In the third place the governor's office is political. He is a
politician and a party leader first and last. Indeed the enormity of his
political duties, as the dominant representative institution, tends to
preclude any activities as chief executive. But does the gubernatorial
office serve as an effective representative institution? Political scientists are agreed that it is impossible for an executive official to represent the popular will as well as a representative body. The functions
of a representative institution are such that they cannot be properly
performed by one person. Yet the federal plan is typified as one man
control which means that the governor is supposed to control and
to keep check upon all the administrative activities. These functions
are suitable only to a representative body or at least a board of directors, and to place them upon the shoulders of the so-called executive
means that of necessity they will be fearfully neglected or at best
poorly performed. Not even in the exceptional accession to office
of an overpowering and intensively active and conscientious person
has there been any approach to satisfactory performance. But usually
the popularly elected executive is "available" and colorless.- The imperfect institution of the legislative investigating committee in its present form has come into being to supplant the glaring incompetence
of the executive to fulfill this vital function. Of course, if the governor is to be the chief administrator, he should not be also the checking
and controlling institution for this would amount to checking himself.
Indeed, the theory of electing the administrative leader allows no place
for a representative body to control the administration for this work
is to be performed by the people at large--the electorate.
OUTLOOK, editorial, Jine 8, 1912.
'
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To conclude, gubernatorial leadership is executive only in a superficial sense, that is, that the governor is the titular "executive" being
thus called in the state constitutions. His leadership is, necessarily,
political rather than executive or administrative. This form of leadership holds little promise because the office attracts a man who at best
is a good party politician and almost never a technician. Too much
confidence should not be placed in such leadership as a basis for
efficiency and economy. However, political leadership in its placethe legislature-is an essential attribute of popular government. So far
from increasing this political leadership and endeavoring to endow him
with administrative leadership, he should be allowed to become only
a titular leader of the state.
The third principle, responsibility, involves the most fundamental
conceptions of constitutional organization. It is a term that has been
subjected to more use and misuse than almost any other term used in
the study of political science. The problem of the degree of independence on the one hand and responsibility on the other which is the
most conducive to efficient government has never been properly treated
although of late some very valuable contributions have been made
by such students as Graham Wallas of England, and Robert Dawson
of Canada.
In the state reorganization movement the problem of responsibility revolves about one person, the governor. He may be held responsible by one of two controlling groups, the legislature or the electorate. As to which of these the governor should be responsible,
the proponents of the federal plan do not always make clear. As a
rule they maintain that the governor should be directly responsible
to the people, but occasionally, they declare he should be accountable
to the legislature as in England. When the incompatibility of the
federal plan and legislative supremacy is admitted, they suggest that
possibly in the future, some sort of cabinet or ministerial responsibility will come into being as an outgrowth of the adoption of that
plan. However, they make no provision in any of the codes for an
evolution of the federal plan into ministerial responsibility. Instead,
they make the governor more independent of the legislature. Their
scheme is virtually an elective kingship. They suggest the possibility
of the governor's "cabinet", but not the governor himself, appearing
on the floor of legislature. From the experience of other countries,
this arrangement would seem insufficient to guarantee the governor's
responsibility to the legislature.-s
The direct responsibility of the governor to the "people" is the
usual stand taken by the federal plan advocates. They tend to adhere to the idea of completely separating the executive and the legislature, and relegating the latter to an insignificant position in the
constitutional scheme. To them the only function of the legislature is
to make laws and the more important "informing function" is disregarded. Hence, the legislature is only vaguely concerned in the
problem of state reorganization. In its practical operation this principle of governor's responsibility may be criticised first, because the
short ballot idea which accompanied the idea of centralized responsi-

" South

American countries have endeavored to secure responsibility of the elected

president to the legislature by requiring his cabinet to appear before the latter body, but
In Chile the transition from executive supremacy to responsible
they have always failed.
government was made by an entirely different process. There the President, since the days
of Balmaceda, was required to compose the ministry of the majority party of Congress.
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bility did not appreciably lighten the burden upon the electorate,
second, because the voters cannot know or judge all of the involved
acts of the administration, third, because, the reorganization codes destroyed boards of inquiry, audit, and control which tended to give this
principle a semblance of reality, fourth, because the governor is not
apprehensive of his responsibility, and fifth, because he continues to
be accountable to the invisible machine.
The protagonists for the federal plan desire to make the governor
entirely responsible for the state administration by abolishing all other
elective executive offices. They argue that by thus shortening the
ballot, the electorate will use greater discrimination, and will hold
that one executive responsible and through him the whole administration. They justly protest that so many executives are held accountable
through direct election that the proponents of more democracy
by way of the long ballot have overshot their mark. But it
is possible to make a similar criticism of the reorganization
movement which tends not to hold too many elected executives accountable but to hold a few elected executives responsible for an enormous number of acts. For this reason, some advocates of the short
ballot, refuse to connect the desideratum of fewer elected officials with
the federal plan to centralize responsibility in the governor.-, The electorate is not able to pass upon a large number of intricate administrative acts any better than upon a great many executive officials. In
fact, the latter alternative would seem to be the lesser of the two evils
because the electorate could use better judgment in the selection of persons upon their general qualifications than they could in the analysis
of 'technical administrative acts. In requiring the voters to check and
control the conduct of the administration, it is possible that they will
not see the woods for the trees. Will they be able to properly weigh
the instances of corruption with the instances of honesty and efficiency?
Will they be able to weigh instances of vicious, deplorable, mediocre,
and first class administration in the proper proportions? And after
that will they be able to decide whether it will be better to let well
enough alone and not take a chance of upsetting the entire administrative machinery and putting in office worse "rascals" than those ousted?
These are the problems that the electors must solve in order to vote
intelligently for a governor under the federal plan. Consequently,
this plan simplifies government in one way but makes it more complicated in another.
Even the electorate which possesses the virtue of eternal viligance
cannot be expected to devote all its time to scrutinizing the activities
of the administrative officials, and therefore, it cannot make intelligent
decisions at frequent intervals as to the merits of their work. What
does it matter about governor's responsibility if the voters cannot know
Furthermore, how
and judge all the facts of his administration?
would they organize if they did? In a city the problem is somewhat
better because prominent civic organizations and newspapers can get
together over night to stop a proposal or to arouse public opinion, but
this cannot be accomplished with the same effectiveness for a whole
state. To quote President Goodnow: "I can not inform myself. I
don't know how to and there are not ten per cent of the citizens who
Governor Charles Evans Hughes in his annual message
Coker, Op. Cit., XVI, 410.
MUNICIPAL RESEARCH, No.
of 1910, took the leadership in the short ballot movement.
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do, and what we do, of course, is to rely. so far as we can upon the
party organization. We say on the whole we think the Democratic
organization is better than the Republican or the Democratic party
is worse than the Republican and we let it go at that, and in a great
many instances we take what happens; where there is unfortunately
an attempt made by a voter to discriminate apart from the party and
to vote for persons then. you get a lot of discordant people in the
government . . . "- This criticism may be applied to the federal plan
as well as to the past constitutional arrangement in the states.
The new codes furthermore destroy important processes which
give the idea of the governor's responsibility to the people a semblance
of reality. Councils and boards, composed of public spirited citizens
and performing functions of investigation, audit, control, and supervision, are often abolished because it is felt that they interfere with the
smooth working of the administrative machinery. Thus organs of control which are in a key position to turn on a powerful searchlight of
publicity upon the governor's administration are blotted out. What
does governor's responsibility amount to under such a scheme? Is the
term not an empty phrase? We say, "All power to the people." Then
the "people" are virtually bound, gagged, and blindfolded. It would
seem that the reorganization advocates would have us think that all
that is necessary for the realization of popular government is that the
voter should go to the polls every two or four years to cast his ballot
for governor. The fact that he is not provided with any information
on the subject of government would apparently seem of little'consequence. To cross a ballot for a candidate for governor and then sit
back as if the whole matter of government and responsibility were
settled smacks of the superstition, supernaturalism and mysticism of the
dark ages.
Not only is the electorate incapable of enforcing the governor's
responsibility and of accurately judging his acts, but the concentration
of authority in one man does not necessarily make him feel more
responsible to popular demand. On the other hand, one who really
wishes to be of greatest possible service to his fellowmen does not
need to be continually prodded along to remind him that unless he
stands in the good graces of the electorate he will lose his job. Is this
the greatest possible incentive that can be given to a man who has
been trained to devote his life to work in the field of pubilc service?
It seems that there must be some other incentive to rendering satisfactory service to the public than the concentration of political "responsibility." Other incentives which inspire one to increase the quality
and efficiency of workmanship may be lost through the overemphasis
of such accountability.
The success or failure of the federal plan depends upon whether
the governor in reality is responsible to "the boss and the machine"
or to "the people." Is invisible government destroyed as the pro-.
ponents of the plan promise? Obviously it is not. As long as the governor is selected independently of the legislature, and dominates that
body politically, it will continue. As observed in the preceding article
such an extra-legal invisible machine is absolutely essential to the
existence of a government where the executive and the legislative
" Dr. Goodnow's speech before the New York State
3, 1915.-MUNICIPAL RESEARCH, No. 63, 599.
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branches a re forced apart. A century's experience shows plainly that
direct election of the executive and invisible government go hand in
hand.- The existence of a powerful machine, which rules the legislative, executive and perhaps to a less extent the judicial branch, is a
source of perversion of popular will and of corruption of administration. To perpetuate "Boss rule", public offices are made spoils for the
victors, issues are submerged and political campaigns are contests between "ins" and the "outs". What is "governor's responsibility" and
"popular control" when such conditions prevail? Little wonder there
is an astounding lethargy on the part of the American voter. Certainly
these constitutional defects are in no small part the cause of nonvoting. That the federal plan has not replaced the irresponsible boss
and machine with responsible officials is attested even by its advocates.
For instance, in criticising the Illinois reorganization code of 1917,
Cleveland and Buck declared: "The cabinet was responsible to the
governor but there was no way of making either the governor or the
cabinet responsible to the electorate or to their representatives."When a principle fails in practice it is in truth no longer a principle. It is an hallucination. Here the fallacy lies in the idea of
democratic control through the choice or rejection of administrative
and executive officials. The failure of the federal plan of reorganization is the failure of every plan based upon this erroneous theory.
Whether one or many executive officials are elected it matters little.
It is the theory not the number that is wrong. Although the voter
perhaps uses less discrimination when he chooses a large number of
executives than when he chooses a small number, there is no fundamental violation of any constitutional principle in the selection of
many executives as long as it is believed feasible to select any. Indeed,
since the cabinet members or department heads have become actual
executives and the "chief executive" only a titular official, it would,
if anything, seem more reasonable to select the department heads by
popular vote than the governor. But the basic error is in the election.
of any administrative or executive officer.The election of such an officer is a violation of the principles of
representative government because popular will is best expressed by
and through a representative body whose chief function is to hold
the administration responsible. Representative government is justified
because the "people" are not able to hold the administration responsible direct. Otherwise direct democracy would be justified and the
federal plan of reorganization would be feasible. Since the people acting enmasse are amorphous and inarticulate, it is absurd to expect
them to exercise this function. There must be created an organ
composed of the representatives of the people. This body, which
should as nearly as possible represent a cross section of the nation,
gives articulate expression to the will of the people. The checking
of the government is the prime duty of such a body. Unlike the federal
plan advocates which desire to center both the controlling and administrative powers in governor, the supporters of true representative government find a radical distinction between these two functions. It is
W'Mill, Op. Cit., 271. See preceding article.
s Cleveland and Buck, Op. Cit., 111.

n Wilson, Op. Cit., 259-261: "The President cannot often be really supreme in matters
of administration. . . . he is powerful rather as a branch of the legislature than as the
Almost all executive functions are specifically bestowed upon
titular head of the executive.
Wilson's remedy however is not popular election hut
the heads of the departments."
permanent tenure as non-political department heads.
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for the representative assembly to perform only the former power.
As John Stuart Mill said:
"The proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and
control the government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts;
to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which any
one considers questionable; to censure them if found condemnable, and,
if the men who compose the government abuse their trust, or fulfill
it in a manner which conflicts with the deliberate sense of the nation,
to expel them from office, and either expressly or virtually appoint
their successors. This is surely ample power and security enough for
the liberty of the nation."Although this "informing function" has all but disappeared from
American representative bodies, leading American authorities have
held that the chief executive should not be accountable directly to
the people but to their representatives-the legislature. As Dr.
Goodnow maintains, "Popular govenment requires that the execution
of the state will shall be subjected to the control of the organ expressing the state will. For an effective executive authority can never be
so representative of the people of a state as a body which can effectively express their will." Even some advocates of the federal plan of reorganization favor
"the development of a procedure in the representative body, the
established forum of the people, to make this popular organ. of the
government effective for inquiry, discussion and publicity," and the
provision "within the government itself a means for the exercise of
critical judgment and for informing the people so that public opinion
might be deliberately formed on current issues after due consideration." Again they say it is the only practical means of inquest,
criticism and discussion for "independent representative bodies are
Although they recognize
the most effective means of publicity.""
this function of the legislature, they turn to the development of a
procedure which makes the executive even more irresponsible and
independent of the representative branch, which makes it possible for
the executive unjustly to assume that his office is more of a representative institution than the representative body itself,-more representative of the people as a whole, and which makes his only
responsibility for all practical purposes to an inarticulate electorate
and to an invisible machine.
Professor Coker in an able criticism of the reorganization movement cited the "dogma" of responsibility as the "fundamental error."
"Popular control of the administration of law is not exercised
principally through the popular selection and dismissal of executive
officers one or many. It is equally exercised in enacting directly or
indirectly a law determining a method of administration. It is an exercise of popular control to determine that we the people want our
health and charitable services expertly rather than politically administered. . . . We the voters don't want to be consulted on such
question every two or four years. We believe that in the long run
the schools will be administered more nearly in accordance with out
needs and desires by not calling upon us to pass periodic judgment
upon the matter.""
Mill Op. Cit. 115.
G66cDNOW, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN U. S.,7.
"'Cleveland and Buck, Op. Cit., 122.
"Coker, Op. Cit., XVI, 409.
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With regard to the "semi-irresponsible position of the governor,"
Professor Allin of the University of Minnesota contends "Just so
long as our chief executive is not subject to a continual criticism by
the legislative body in respect both to his policy and the character of his
administration, just so long as he is not forced to defend his conduct
and to present the necessary public documents for critical analysis
and investigation by the legislature, the office of the governor will
be almost inevitablly one of more or less arbitrary power in the hands
of a strong and vigorous chief of state."
Thus the principle of governor's responsibility is a failure in
practice and erroneous in theory. These defects in the three main
principles of the reorganization movement-unity, leadership, and
responsibility-are alone sufficient to condemn it, but it is open to
further criticism for not recognizing 'that the factors of continuity
and competency are equally essential to efficient and economical
government.
As regards continuity, instances could perhaps be found under
the new codes where changes of administration mean the sweeping
out of the administrative services and a loss to the state of many
millions. In fact, those in a position to speak declare that under
the Ohio code, it costs the state highway department over a half
million dollars every time there is a change in administration. Surely
if economy is reallly ivhat the advocates of the new codes are after
then they should at least give some recognition to continuity of
policy and personnel. With the breakdown of the reorganization
plan, its advocates more and more turn to the need for continuity.
For instance, W. F. Dodd, one of the proponents concedes that
"perhaps the most important single problem in connection with the
state executive department is that of continuity of policy," and maintains that "if each new state administration is to bring in a change
of personnel and a change of general policy no scheme of executive
responsibility can work satisfactorily."-, It is hoped that this
represents the beginning of a general. swing on the part of the reorganization proponents from the adherence to the illusion of an
all powerful governor's direct responsibility to the people over to
the acceptance of the pragmatic realism of continuity.
In the past, except for giving moral support to the civil service
reform movement reorganization advocates have made no effort to
attain greater permanency in personnel. However, the civil service
commissions, usually effect only the lower grades of the service.
Even there they are all too frequently unable to withstand the pressure of the rachine. just what ranking officials should have a
permanent tenure or serve as political officials going out of office
with the governor, there is no crystallized opinion. But under the
Ohio code, prepared under the guidance of W. F. Dodd and others,
a formidable number of offices were taken off the classified lists,
and placed on the "spoils" basis. This is justified on the theory
of the governor's responsibility for all appointments. For instance,
one student in praising the Ohio codes indicates that the theory
of reorganization makes it necessary to use the administrative de4SDodd, W. F., Reorganiihg State Government, ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, CXII, 168.
Wilson, Op. Cit.,
255: "Short terms which cut off the efficient as surely and inexorably as the inefficient
are quite as repugnant to republican as to monarchial rules of wisdom.
A President is
dismissed almost as soon as he has learned the duties of his office."
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partments for the purpose of "getting more and better jobs for the
political henchmen," but, "at any rate, the governor will be responsible."- This seems to be the usual method of justifying the
slackening of the merit system. Other supporters blandly assume
that the governor will appoint the administrative officers below the
rank of division chief only with the purpose of securing the most
competent and highly skilled, while the bureau chiefs and department heads will be selected on a political basis. Thus, to expect that
he will arbitrarily ignore political considerations in certain classes,
or in any appointments for that matter is to manifest a total disregard
for practical politics.
In criticising the dearth of continuity under the Ohio code, Mr.
Miles, of the Ohio Institute, observes that "frequent turnover renders
progressive achievement difficult if not practically impossible and that
only through occasional re-election do state officials serve more than
two years.",- He sees the possibility of securing greater permanence
and continuity not in the lengthening of the term of the governor
but in relieving the governor of all administrative responsibi!ity-the
very contradiction of all reorganization schemes. Not only are
students and observers of governmental activities apprenhensive of
the evils resulting from the lack of continuity, but even a surprising
number of politically appointed department heads complain because
they are ousted from office by a new administration after only two
years of service and before they have had an opportunity to really
learn their task. The failure to provide for continuity makes efficiency and economy under the reorganization codes a myth.
Insufficient safeguards against incompetency in administration
constitute as grave a fault in the reorganization codes as the absence
of continuity. The relationship of administrative incompetence to
political partisanship is manifest from the following statement of
Charles Evans Hughes:
."It probably is the opinion of the average citizen that the great
obstacle to administrative efficiency is official corruption. .

.

. The

purchase of public offices, the sale of indulgences to law-breakers to
enhance the fortunes of those who control appointments to office,
systematic levies for official favors,-these are crimes of the first
magnitude. . . .But I believe that the grosser forms of corruption are
happily more rare. . . . Corrupting influences have become more in-

sidious and for this reason are perhaps more dangerous. They are
rarely susceptible of proof; they leave few traces and largely defy
investigation. These are the influences which are shown in the play
of favoritism, in the payment of private obligations through official
discretion, in permitting information to be given in advance of official
solicitations which imply official promises. Larceny and embezzlement have largely given place to conspiracies and-shrewd agreements
for mutual protection and enrichment. Akin to these evils is the
blighting influence of efforts to support partisan workers at the
public expense. .

.

. This practice not only affords the means through

which administrative action is perverted in order to hold and to pay
for political support, but it also forms the avenue for the introduction
of incompetents into the public service and leads to the multiplication
.See
Masters thesis by Carl Finn on State Reorganization
University).
"Miles, Op. Cit., CXIII, 110.

in Ohio, 39.

(Ohio State

BAR BRIEFS

of unnecessary places. Partisan political incumbrances to a great
extent account for administrative palsy."This statement of Hughes' should be borne in mind when one
hears reorganization advocates say that "politics" cannot and ought
not be removed from administration. To clarify the issues the term
"politics" should be more accurately defined. It might be used in
one of three senses. First, it might mean general policies of government as distinguished from technical or routine matters of administration. The legislative body is finding it increasingly more necessary
to delegate policy determining powers to administrative bodies owing
to the increasing complexity of governmental activities. In this sense
the more "politics" is injected into administration the better. But this
does not involve the assumption that this determination of broad
policies and quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial matters should be
determined by party politicians and henchmen filling the admlinistrative offices. Second, "politics" might mean the gift of handling
men as individuals and as groups. Although this at times connotes
the ability to handle voters and to lead in the activities of political
parties, it does not necessarily involve any such implications. In
fact, a man might possess all of these qualifications for handling
men and acting as the chief administrator of a large administrative
department or corporation while being absolutely free 'from any
political or party attachments. Therefore, in this second sense also the
term need not possess any undesirable implications. Third, "politics"
might mean the exercise of power in a selfish, partisan and dishonest
manner. This is the sense in which the term is most frequently
used with reference to public administration. One often hears this
statement: "Oh, if we could only keep the administration of this
service out of politics." Indeed, the problem of eliminating political
favoritism and influence from administration is no small matter as
Hughes has pointed out. But under present circumstances, such a
condition is easly accounted for. Owing to the obligations of the
elected governor to the bosses who are instrumental in placing him
in office, it is only natural for him to give ear to their demands in
making appointments. In fact, the governor is so dependent upon
their power that frequently he becomes little more than a puppet-a
dummy on the knee of a master ventriloquist. Political administration in this third sense is not a matter to be trifled with.
The proponents of the federal plan for states deliberately encourage
political manipulation of administration. Consequently, that movement has brought upon itself a tirade of criticism from not only those
interested in competency in specialized fields of administration but
from students of government as well. The latter demand expert
rather than political administration and declare that it is in the
interest of both democracy and competency that the department heads
be selected by continuing councils or boards of directors rather than
by a governor.,
"HUGHES,
CHARLES EVANS, CONDITIONS OF PROGRESS IN A DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, 45-6. Speech of Elihu Root, MUNICIPAL RESEARCH No. 63,
619.
" oker, Op. Cit., XVI, 409.
Wilson, Op. Cit., 264, 269: "Fur bearing animals can
have no connection with political parties, . . . except, perhaps, as 'spoils.' Indeed it is a
positive disadvantage that Mr. Secretary should be chosen upon such a principle. He cannot have the knowledge and msust therefore lack the efficiency, of a permanent official
separated from partisan conflicts of politics (italics mine) and advanced to the highest office
of his department by a regular series of promotions won by long service . . . 'No one
doubted that he (Secretary of Navy) would treat the Department as spoils and consequently
nobody has been disappointed.' "
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The reorganization movement furthers incompetence in five
ways, by the failure to provide for continuity, by accepting the constitutional dogma of executive supremacy which makes the machine
necessary, by actually advocating political appointments to enforce
political responsibility, by destroying functional unity through the
organic separation of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial from administrative acts within a given field, and by lowering the morale
of the personnel. The relation of continuity to competency has
already been treated. That executive supremacy makes for inefficiency by enhancing the power of the boss and the machine is clear
from a century of our political history. It has already been noted
that invisible government is necessary in order to have any sort of
harmony where the executive and legislative branches are virtually
independent, and that political patronage is one of the best ways to
build up a powerful party machine. In view of these factors, it is
inevitable that the adoption of the federal plan does not destroy
invisible government or replace the spoils politician with the competent technician.
The reorganization protagonists insure incompetence by deliberately advocating political appointments and partisan administration.
By such measures, they believe they could bring the politician out
in the open. could make the governor the visible boss, and could
destroy invisible government. In advancing the federal plan for
states, the supporters reveal how they connect political administration with their principles of unity, leadership, and responsibility.
They maintain that it is impossible to keep politics out of administration, and that, therefore, we should provide for political administration throughout by electing only one man as executive head and
should allow him to appoint all his subordinates in order to hold
him personally responsible for all acts of the administration. Apparently one must conclude that the spoils system must be injected
into the civil service from the highest official to the lowest employee
and there must be a wild scramble for office every two years in
order to maintain "governor's responsibility" and keep the administration political. Such a stand is inherently wrong. It is wrong
in theory because the relegation of political representatives and their
activities to the legislative body is the very cornerstone of representative government. It is wrong in practice because the administrative'
work is technical and routine. Consequently, there is no place for an expression of partisan political policy or the practice of favoritism. What
is the policy of the Republican party as against the Democratic party
relative to collecting statistics, keeping books, cleaning streets, or
washing windows? Why is a Republican rather than a Democrat
inherently fitted because of party affiliation to manage an insane
asylum, to fight against the ravages of disease, or to solve intricate
problems of mental hygiene? These queries seem almost nonsensical
to the writer, but they are apparently reasonable to those who proclaim
that partisan politics must be injected into administration.
To the extent the new codes destroy functional unity, efficiency
of administration is lowered. This results from the attempt to
reconcile the use of independent, non-political boards, councils, or
commissions for quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial purposes with
the principle of governor's political responsibility. To enforce this
principle, these inconsistent departmental types are deprived of all
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power but the mere promulgation of regulations or decisions. In
Ohio, even the staff, which collects the data upon which the commission makes its decisions is accountable not to the commission
but to the director of another department who is politically responsible
to the governor.,- But the commission, and not the political director
of the other department, is responsible for the rules and decisions
issued. All value accruing from the commission's independence is
thus virtually destroyed. This seems to be carrying the dogma of
responsibility to the ridiculous. At least it is carrying it to the extent
of defeating the end of the commission's creation, violating the logical
principle of functional unity, and hence abdicating efficiency and
economy.
The morale of the personnel is distinctly lowered under the
new codes. Few capable technologists are willing to enter the public
service under political administrations, Indeed, experts, who head
state departments by virtue of their appointment by non-political
boards, have declared that they would resign at once if they were to
be appointed by the governor. The lack of independence, honor, and
respect connected with political service, the uncertainty of tenure, the
acquiesence in an atmosphere of chicanery, partisanship, and favoritism are elements repulsive to the well trained and highly skilled
administrators proud of their professions. Experts, who might
possibly be employed in less important positions, would be subordinated to incompetent chiefs. This is of necessity the case because the
department heads and bureau chiefs under the new codes are supposed
to be appointed on a political basis. The issue between political
administration and competent administration is clear. Do we want
professional technicians or professional politicians operating our
health, welfare, educational, and other services? That the federal
plan for states gives the,latter, there is little question.
In resume, the movement to reorganize the states on basis of the
federal plan makes distinct advances in the elimination of overlapping
jurisdiction and duplication of effort, in the reduction of overhead
costs and routine clerical and field forces through the functional
arrangement of organization units, and in the institution of the
budget system and standardized methods of administration. But the
defects of the movement should not be overlooked. It violates the
'foundation principles of representative government; oversimplifies the
problem of administration, and overcentralizes the jurisdiction and
powers of the governor beyond the means of human capacity; fails
to make him appreciative of his administrative leadership; fails to
make him apprehensive of his responsibilities to the "people"; overburdens the electorate with duties for which it is unfitted; destroys
boards with powers of publicity and investigation which are essential
to popular government and the proper functioning of public opinion;
poisons the whole administrative system at its most vital points with
the spirit of the political spoilsman; weakens and at times retards
the civil service reform movement; disrupts functional unity by
arbitrarily separating quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial from administrative acts; increases the turnover of employees and department
heads; expels the technologist and replaces him with the politician;
creates such an administrative system that a trained executive would
seldom if ever accept an appointment even if offered by the governor,
a

Coker, OP. Cit., XVI, 407.
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owing to the very temporary character of the office and the undesirable political atmosphere in which he would have to acquiesce.
In weighing the failures and successes of the reorganization
movement, we are led to conclude that the movement has failed to
accomplish its chief objectives. So far from achieving its goal of
responsible government, it has actually destroyed the advances
previously made by the movement to take certain state services out of
"politics" and to secure competency and continuity of administration.
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